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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Executive Secretariat

27 March 1986

TO: DCI
DDI

Attached is a late item for the Poindexter
book from Dave Gries.

STAT



~~SECRET~~

27 March 1986
OCA: 86-0914

NOTE FOR: The Director
FROM: David Gries
SUBJECT: Congressional Strategy on Nicaragua; Admiral
Poindexter's Request for Views

1. While debate continues in the Senate, we should examine circumstances that could stall a Senate-passed bill in the House.

-The House leadership could, but probably will not, attach the Senate bill to a veto candidate, such as a supplementary appropriations bill.

-The Senate bill could also be sent to languish in committee, but this too is unlikely.

-The Rules Committee could rule that the Senate bill can be amended in the House, leading to long debate and perhaps a useless bill.

2. On the other hand, Speaker O'Neil did promise his colleagues a 15 April vote on the Senate bill, and none of the above noted possibilities fully meets that commitment.

-Moreover, during a Wright-Michel exchange on the floor yesterday, Wright said the Senate bill should be attached to "a viable bill", not one headed for a veto.

3. If Wright is reflecting the Speaker's views, then the House will have an opportunity to vote again on a "clear" bill. This suggests that as soon as the Senate completes action, appropriate House members should be approached immediately, including by telephone, since most will be away from Washington.

-It is important to start this process of briefing and discussion immediately, rather than, as in the case of the first House vote on H. Res. 540, waiting until the week of the vote.

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
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-The last week of March and the first week of April provide a window for the kind of early action that is needed.

-If the Administration waits until the House returns from recess on 8 April, it could be too late to pick up the 10 to 15 votes needed.

25X1



David D. Gries

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Attached is a late item from for
the Poindexter book. It supplements TAB C.

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27 March 1986

NOTE FOR: DCI

SUBJECT: Possible NSC Action On Packard Commission Report

25X1 As I mentioned to you this morning, I heard late last night [redacted] that the NSC staff is working on an NSDD that would draw on the Packard Commission Report. It would implement a National Security Strategy. (No one here has been consulted in this as yet, or asked to comment on any drafts--hopefully this would occur at some point as it is unlikely such an NSDD would not touch on DCI equities and authorities as currently established.)

25X1 You previously asked for Bob Gates' comments on one aspect of the Packard Commission report, that dealing with CIA/JCS net assessments. Bob's recommendation was that we build on existing agreements with SecDef for strategic net assessments and deal with OSD vice the JCS. (A copy of your memo and Bob's response is attached.)

cc: DDI

Attachment



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Executive Registry

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18 March 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Packard Commission

1. I got a call from David Packard before I took off for my trip to tell me that his commission has recommended that we, together with the Joint Chiefs, be tasked to prepare a net assessment of the effectiveness of US and Allied forces as compared to those of our adversaries. See page 7 of the Packard report attached.

2. I'd like to know in general what kind of shape we are in to go beyond the existing net assessment on strategic forces to embrace our conventional forces, Allied forces, Warsaw Pact conventional forces, as well perhaps as subversive and paramilitary forces. I'd like to see an informed first guesstimate on the magnitude of such a task and the capabilities we have on hand to carry it out, even though I don't think we will settle down to do anything about it for some time. Still, we should be prepared for discussions with Defense, the Chiefs, and NSC on the kind of undertaking it might be.


William J. Casey

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Meeting with Admiral Poindexter

27 March 1986

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
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
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David D. Gries

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